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NEW TRIALS AND THE NEED
FOR UNIFORMITY IN STANDARDS
INTRODUCTION

Under modern practice, a post trial motion commonly includes, what were under prior practice, two motions challenging
the verdict solely on the weight of the evidence; a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new
trial.1 Each of these motions, if both are presented,2 must be
ruled on by the trial judge.
In a recent case, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the
problem of the disparity in standards applied by those courts confronted with the question of when to direct or grant a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict stating:
The formulae evolved by the courts for determining when the
circumstances are appropriate for taking the case from the jury
are many and varied, and understandably so, for there is no mathematically exact standard or rule . . . which will enable the trial
judge or reviewing court to ascertain precisely when the proof in
a given case presents a factual situation with sufficient certainty
4
to justify removing it from a jury's consideration.
The Illinois court thereupon arrived at a unified standard
to guide the trial judge with respect to directing or granting a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict stating:
[V]erdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only
in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its
aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelming favors
movant that no contrary verdict on that evidence could ever stand.5
Yet anomalously, the Supreme Court has remained silent

with respect to the problem of the disparity in standards governing the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial. The standards applied to determine when the trial judge should grant a
new trial and the scope of review of his decision have been as
varied as those previously applied to motions for a directed ver-

dict and to motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 6
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §68.1(2) (1967); May v. Columbian Rope, 40
Ill. App. 2d 264, 189 N.E.2d 394 (1963).

2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §68.1(2)

(1967)

does not require both mo-

tions to be made; either may be made independently of the other.
3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §68.1(2) (1967).
4 Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R., 37 Ill.2d 494, 500-01, 229 N.E.2d
504, 508 (1967).
5 Id. at 510, 229 N.E.2d at 513-14.
0 The predominant view had been that a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict presented only a question of whether there was
any evidence to support the verdict. Stilfield v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec.
Co., 25 Ill. App. 2d 478, 167 N.E.2d 295 (1960). But see Mesich v. Austin,
70 Ill. App. 2d 334, 217 N.E.2d 574 (1966), in which the dissenting opinion
advocates the use of the "manifest weight" or "predominance of the evidence" standards to determine the propriety of a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
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Indeed, ruling on a motion for a new trial, unlike ruling on a
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, requires the
application of different standards on both the trial and appellate
level.
A motion for a new trial presents, not a question of law, but
a question of fact. Inasmuch as questions of fact were always
determined by a jury, new trials based on the assertion that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence were slow in gaining
judicial approval. In fact, under the early Illinois jury system
a verdict could not be attacked on the ground that it was against
the weight of the evidence.7 The only available proceeding was
an action against the jurors directly, in which they could be
severely punished for rendering a false verdict." Due to the
severity of these penalties, the trial courts began the practice of
setting aside a verdict if it was found to be against the weight of
the evidencef With the advent of this procedure, the questions
arose as to what standard the trial judge should use in his determination and, if such determination is subject to review, what
standard of review should be followed by the appellate court.
THE TRIAL STANDARD

That a verdict is contrary to, or not sustained by the evidence
is generally considered a proper standard under which a trial
judge may grant a new trial. Such language is found in the
statutes of numerous states, for example: that the verdict is
"contrary to the evidence,"' 10 or "contrary to the weight of the
evidence,"' " or "against the evidence ;,,12 that the verdict is "not
sustained by sufficient evidence,"" or "not sustained by the great
preponderance of the evidence,"' 4 or "not justified by the evidence."' 5 "Insufficiency of the evidence"1 6 and "insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict"'1 7 are also statutory grounds
for a new trial. In applying the standard, the trial judge must
decide what facts are to be considered in determining the pro7See Mullen v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. App. 2d 103, 109,
178 N.E.2d 670, 673 (1961).
8id.

9 Id.
10 GA. CODE ANN. §70-202 (1963); LA. STAT. ANN., CODE CIV. PROC. art.
1972(1) (WEST 1961); Mo. ANN. STAT., RULES OF SUPREME COURT, rule
27.19(5) (VERNON 1949) ; CODE OF VA. §§8-352, 8-491 (1950).
- ARiZ. REV. STAT., RULES CRIM. PROC. rule 310(2) (1956) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. §920.04(2) (1944).
12 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 113, §59 (1954).
Is ARK. STAT. §27-1901(6) (1947); IOWA CODE ANN., RULES CIV. PROC.
rule 244(f) (1951); OKLA. STAT. ANN., CIV. PROC. §651(6) (1951).
14 ALAS. CODE tit. 7, §276 (1959).
15 MINN. STAT. ANN., COURT RULES rule 59.01(8) (1966).
16 COLO. REV. STAT., RULES Civ. PROC. rule 59(a) (6) (1963) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT: §1-207 (1953).
17 ANN. CAL. CODES, CODE CIV. PROC. §657(6) (WEST 1955) ; UTAH CODE
ANN., RULES Civ. PROC. rule 58(a) (6) (1953).

160

The John MarshallJournalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 2:158

priety of the motion. Thus, it is often stated that a motion for
a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge, 8 or the judge may exercise considerable discretion in
passing on the motion.1 9 The rule is equally applicable whether,
20
in the exercise of his discretion, the judge grants a new trial
21
or denies the motion.
In Illinois...
The practice in the trial courts of Illinois, with regard to
motions for a new trial, although not prescribed by statute,
closely approximates that used in numerous other states. The
standard that has been most widely applied by trial judges in
Illinois in ruling on the motion is the "preponderance of the evidence standard. 21 2 The term "preponderance," in the context
of this standard, means the greater weight of the evidence, or
evidence which is more credible and convincing to the mind.2 3 If,
in applying this standard, the trial judge determines that the
verdict is against the preponderance of the evidence, he must
24
grant a new trial.
Applying the "preponderance standard" to the facts in a case
requires the judge to weigh the evidence. 25 At this point, the
legal discretion of the judge becomes quite significant, because
he must determine the weight to be accorded each item received
in evidence. He must consider not only the quantity of the evidence adduced by both parties, but also the quality of this evidence. After deciding what the relevant facts are and where
these facts should be grouped, either for the benefit of the plaintiff or the defendant, the judge then applies the "preponderance
is E.g., Shoopman v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 169 Cal. App. 2d 848,
338 P.2d3 (1959). See also 66 C.J.S. New Trial §201 (1950).
19 See 66 C.J.S. New Trial §201 n. 21 (1950), for a comprehensive listing of the courts that take this position.
20 Id. at n. 22.
21 Id. at n. 23.
22 Read v. Cummings, 324 Ill. App. 607, 59 N.E.2d 325 (1945).
This
case involved an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial.
The trial judge had stated that it was not within his province to judge the
manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court in reversing and remanding the case stated:
The law on this subject is plain. Where a motion is made by defendant at the close of all the evidence to direct a verdict, the court cannot
weigh the evidence, but the evidence must be considered in the light
most favorable to plaintiff and obviously such motion should then be
denied if there is any evidence, more than a scintilla, that may
be reasonably construed to prove plaintiff's case. . . . But after the
verdict is returned a different question arises. It is then the duty of
the trial judge to consider the weight of the evidence and if he is of
opinion that plaintiff has not proven his case by a preponderance of
the evidence, taking into consideration the fact that the jury has found
otherwise, it is his duty to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
Id. at 609, 59 N.E.2d at 326.
23 Griffy v. Ellis, 26 Ill. App. 2d 112, 117, 168 N.E.2d 58, 61 (1960).
24 Read v. Cummings, 324 Ill. App. 607, 609, 59 N.E.2d 325, 326 (1945).
25
Id.
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of the evidence standard" to the facts in order to determine
whether the jury's verdict will stand.
Because the judge must necessarily make value judgments
in evaluating the quality of the evidence, certain limitations have
been placed on the exercise of his discretion. His discretion must
be reasonably exercised ;26 i.e., the judge must take into account
the fact that the jury heard the evidence, observed the witnesses
and rendered a verdict on these facts.2 7 The trial judge may not
set aside the verdict and grant a new trial merely because he
would have decided the case differently or merely because he disbelieved the evidence.2 8 Following the entry of an order by the
trial judge, either granting or denying the motion for a new
trial, the unsuccessful party may appeal such order to the ap29
pellate court.

THE APPELLATE STANDARDS

Where Motion Granted...
The standard to be applied by the appellate court in its review of an order granting a new trial varies among the states.
Nevertheless, three basic patterns are discernible. In a minority
of states the trial judge, in granting a new trial, has almost unlimited discretion which will not be deemed abused "where there
is any evidence which would support a judgment in favor of the
moving party." 30 In these states, the trial judge is, in effect, invited to act as the thirteenth and controlling juror. 1 In a second
group of states, also a minority, the trial judge is forbidden to
set aside a verdict if "on the evidence as presented and under the
pleadings, the jury could reasonably have found in accordance
with the verdict as rendered ....,,32Thus, in these states, the
propriety of the exercise of such discretion is far more narrowly
26

Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill.
App. 2d 20, 27, 175 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1961).

27 Hanck v. Ruan Transp. Corp., 3 Ill. App. 2d 372, 380, 122 N.E.2d

445, 449 (1951).
28

(1967).

Dunlavey v. Patti, 79 Ill. App. 2d 442, 446, 223 N.E.2d 858, 860
See also Foster v. VanGilder, 65 Ill. App. 2d 373, 376-77, 213

N.E.2d 421, 423 (1965).
29 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §306 (1967).

See also text at notes 82-83
infra. If the motion for a new trial is granted, the party against whom it

is entered may petition for leave to appeal or may wait until the case is
retried and then appeal the order granting the new trial along with any
other matter raised during the new trial.
30 Hawk v. City of Newport Beach, 46 Cal.2d 213, 219, 293 P.2d 48,
51 (1956). See Denney v. Tate, 96 Ga. App. 3, 99 S.E.2d 296 (1957); McLaughlin v. Broyles, 36 Tenn. App. 391, 255 S.W.2d 1020 (1952).
31 McLaughlin v. Broyles, 36 Tenn. App. 391, 397, 255 S.W.2d 1020,
1023 (1952).
32 Kerrigan v. Detroit Steel Corp., 146 Conn. 658, 659-60, 154 A.2d 517,
518 (1959). See Monihan v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 22 N.J.
Super. 149, 91 A.2d 585 (1952); Dyer v. Hastings, 87 Ohio App. 147, 94
N.E.2d 213 (1950).
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delimited than that of the trial judge in the first group of states.
In these stricter-test jurisdictions, judges are frequently reversed
for setting aside a verdict in violation of the standard.33 Furthermore, in these states the standard for a new trial is phrased
and administered in such a way that it would appear to be nearly
analogous to the standard for directing a verdict, though the
3
two are not fully coextensive. 4
Most jurisdictions, however, take an intermediate position
as to the appropriate standard of review. This position was well
35
summarized in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts:
On such a motion it is the duty of the [trial] judge to set aside
the verdict and grant a new trial, if he is of opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon
evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of justice,
even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent
the direction of a verdict.36
Such a standard does not contemplate that the trial judge substitute his judgment for that of the jury. It adjures trial courts
to accept jury findings on matters of credibility of testimony and
weight of evidence, even where the judge disagrees with them,
"unless the verdict is clearly against the undoubted general current of the evidence, so that the court can clearly see that they
have acted under some mistake, or from some improper motive,
bias, or feeling."''
As a result, in those jurisdictions that adhere
to this standard, there are few reversals of orders granting new
38
trials.
In Illinois...
In Illinois, the standard applied in the review of the trial
judge's order granting a new trial falls within the intermediate
position taken by the appellate courts of the majority of the
states. The Illinois appellate courts hold that neither an order
granting nor an order denying a motion for a new trial may be
set aside in the absence of a clear "abuse of discretion" on the
part of the trial judge. 3
This rule is qualified by yet another
rule which declares that the trial judge has greater discretion in
33See, e.g., Hagstrom v. Sargent, 137 Conn. 556, 79 A.2d 189 (1951).
'3 See Joannis v. Engstrom, 135 Conn. 248, 63 A.2d 151 (1948); Roma
v. Thames River Specialties Co., 90 Conn. 18, 96 A. 169 (1915), where a
new trial order was upheld but probably a verdict should not have been
directed. In Ohio, the equation between the standards seems to be complete. Dyer v. Hastings, 87 Ohio App. 147, 94 N.E.2d 213 (1950).
35 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941).'
3Id. at 352-53. See also 39 AM. JUR. New Trial §§129-31 (1942).
31 Fuller v. Fletcher, 6 F. 128, 129-30 (D.R.I. 1881).
3 C. Wright, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW *OF FEDERAL COURTS 368-69- (1963).
89 E.g., Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill. App. 2d 20, 27, 175 N.E.2d 796, 799
(1961).
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granting than in denying a motion for a new trial.40 The courts
have held that this 'greater scope of discretion indicates a re-

luctance, on the part of the appellate court, to interfere with an
order granting a new trial.4 1 Two reasons for this reluctance are
stated. First, the judge who initially hears the case is afforded
an opportunity to observe the trial proceeding and determine
42
whether a fair trial has resulted and substantial justice done.
Secondly, an order granting a new trial is only an interlocutory
order, while an order denying a new trial results in a final judg43
ment.

It is submitted that neither of these reasons justifies the
trial judge having greater discretion in granting than in denying
a motion for a new trial. The first reason is easily rebutted once
it is recognized that a trial judge has the same opportunity to

observe the trial and determine whether substantial justice has
been done when he denies the motion for a new trial, as when
he grants the new trial. 44 The reasoning that the grant of a new
trial is an interlocutory order and thus does not operate as
harshly upon the party against whom is is entered, is also of
dubious merit when it is considered that the successful party at
the trial must relinquish a favorable verdict and suffer the time
and expense of a retrial. 45 Nevertheless, taking the situation as
it exists, it is apparent that a finding of an abuse of discretion by
the appellate court in reviewing an order granting a new trial

will rarely occur, save under three unusual circumstances: (a)
when there could be no other verdict

;46

(b) when the judge has

40 Village of LaGrange v. Clark, 278 Ill. App. 269 (1934). The appellate court in ruling on the correctness of the trial judge's order setting aside
a verdict and granting a new trial stated:
It is generally held that motions for a new trial are addressed to the
discretion of the trial court and are not reviewable unless the record
shows a clear abuse of such discretion, especially where such motions
were based on questions of fact arising on the trial, or on matters which
occurred in the presence of the court during the trial.

.

.

. Appellate

courts have encouraged trial courts in exercising this discretion to prevent a miscarriage of right and are reluctant to interfere unless the
discretion has been exercised capriciously, arbitrarily or improvidently.
Even greater latitude is allowed the trial court in granting than in refusing new trials, and the appellate court will interfere more reluctantly
where the new trial is granted than where it is denied, since in such
cases the rights of the parties are not finally settled as they are where
the new trial is refused.
Id. at 285.
41 E.g., Couch v. Southern Ry., 294 Ill. App. 490, 492, 14 N.E.2d 266,
267 (1938).
42 Id. at 492-93, 14 N.E.2d at 267.
43 Id. at 493, 14 N.E. 2d at 267.
44 Read v. Cummings, 324 Ill. App. 607, 609-10, 59 N.E.2d 325, 326
(1945).
45 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 349 Ill. App. 175, 182-83, 110 N.E.2d 654,
657 (1953).
46 Redding v. Schroeder, 54 Ill. App. 2d 306, 315, 203 N.E.2d 616, 62021 (1964).
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acted arbitrarily or capriciously ;47 (c) when the judge has written a memorandum setting out his reasons for granting the new
trial and such reasons are improper. 48 Since these circumstances
rarely materialize, there are few cases in which an order granting

a new trial has been reversed.
Where Motion Denied...

The standard used for appellate review of an order denying
a motion for a new trial, in Illinois, differs from the standard used
in reviewing an order granting a new trial, and varies among the
several states. Some states have taken the position that the denial
of a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed where there was
sufficient evidence to support the verdict or judgment ;49 where
there was a conflict in the evidence on which the verdict or finding
was based, 0 or where the testimony warranted submission of the
case to the jury.5 1 Other states have taken the position that the
order of the trial court denying a new trial will be set aside where
the verdict is unsupported by the evidence,52 where there has been
a manifest denial of justice, 53 where the verdict is clearly wrong

55
and unjust,54 where the trial judge's decision is clearly wrong,

or where the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.8 6 The standard followed in Illinois approximates the po-

sition of the latter jurisdictions mentioned above, and has been
characterized as the "manifest weight of the evidence stand57

ard."

4T Wagner v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 288 Ill. App. 402, 405, 6 N.E.2d
250, 251 (1937) ; Village of LaGrange v. Clark, 278 Ill. 269, 285 (1934).
48 Dunlavey v. Patti, 79 Ill. App. 2d 442, 446, 223 N.E.2d 858, 860
(1967).
49 Goodman v. Norwalk Jewish Center, Inc., 145 Conn. 146, 154, 139
A.2d 812, 816 (1958). See Manis v. Bing, 98 Ga. App. 232, 105 S.E.2d 463
(1958) ; Blair v. Williams, 109 Cal. App. 2d 516, 240 P.2d 1043 (1952).
50 Florida Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 73 Fla. 970, 977, 75 S.
528, 532 (1917). See Northern Indiana Fin. Co. v. Yakob, 105 Ind. App.
1, 13 N.E.2d 313 (1938).
51 Guignard Brick Works v. Allen Univ., 155 S.C. 507, 520, 152
S.E. 707, 711 (1930).
52 Templin v. Crestliner, Inc., 263 Minn. 149, 151, 116 N.W.2d 178, 180
(1962).
53 Kulbacki v. Sobchinsky, 38 N.J. 435, 446, 185 A.2d 835, 842 (1962).
See Feltovich v. City of Sharon, 409 Pa. 314, 186 A.2d 247 (1962).
54 Kendall v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 336 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Ct. of
Civ. App. of Texas) (1960).
55 Harju v. Shelby Mut. Cas. Co., 91 R.I. 294, 301-02, 162 A.2d 532, 536
(1960). See Tellefsen v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 158 Cal. App. 2d 243,
322 P.2d 469 (1958).
56 Rochester Civic Theatre, Inc. v. Ramsay, 368 F.2d 748, 753 (8th Cir.
1966).
57 Mullen v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. App. 2d 103, 110, 178
N.E.2d 670, 673 (1961). This court declared:
[A] reviewing court in passing upon the verdict of a jury should not
allow itself the latitude which the common law allowed to the trial court,
that is, to set aside the verdict as against the weight or preponderance
of the evidence. To express that qualification of the power of the Appellate Court, different terms were used, such as 'strong preponderance,'
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The term "manifest" has been defined as "palpable, evident,
apparent to the senses, obvious, and... show[n] plainly."5
Other terms have been used to delineate the standard. The two
more common terms employed in place of "manifest weight of
the evidence" to identify the standard are, "clearly and palpably
erroneous" 59 and "opposite conclusion clearly evident."60 Each
of these phrases is recognizably derived from the term "manifest," as defined. Lack of uniformity in the terms by which the
standard is designated, itself, accounts for much of the confusion
in the area.
Applying this standard, the appellate court weighs the evidence in order to determine if the verdict is against its manifest
weight. 61 It is evident that to justify setting aside a verdict
under the "manifest standard" will require a more blatant showing of "insufficiency of the evidence," than is required under the
"preponderance standard" used by the trial judge.. 2 Requiring
this higher standard is justified for the reason that the appellate
court has only the record of the trial proceedings and briefs of
counsel to guide it, while the trial judge has the benefit of personal observation of witnesses, of their manner in testifying,
and of other circumstances aiding in the determination of credibility, thus putting him in a better position to weigh the evidence.65
...

While the rationale of the "manifest standard" is relatively
clear, there is confusion regarding the application of this standard to the facts and evidence of individual cases which indicates
a lack of uniformity among the courts. In Bunton v. Illinois
Central Railroad,64 the court pointed out that there exist two
schools of thought in the Illinois appellate court concerned with
the application of the "manifest standard." The first of these
concludes that a jury verdict should be upheld in almost every
case. In brief, this school is confident of the ability of jurors to
correctly decide questions of fact and to determine where a pre'where the verdict was clearly wrong,' or 'manifest weight.' The last
phrase, 'manifest weight,' was the one most frequently used.
Id.
58 Seeden v. Kolarik, 350 Ill. App. 238, 243, 112 N.E.2d 514, 516 (1953).
Cf.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961 ed.)

which

defines "manifest," as capable of being readily and instantly perceived by
b. capable of
the senses and esp. by the sight: not hidden or concealed .
"
being easily understood or recognized at once by the mind ...
59 Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 412, 419, 128 N.E.2d 363, 366

(1955).

60 Hammer v. Slive, 27 Ill. App. 2d 196, 201, 169 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1960).
61 Mullen v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. App. 2d 103, 111, 178

N.E.2d 670, 673-74 (1961).

62 Read v. Cummings, 324 Ill. App. 607, 610, 59 N.E.2d 325, 326 (1945).

Accord, Village of LaGrange v. Clark, 278 Ill. App. 269, 285 (1934).
63 Couch v. Southern Ry., 294 Ill. App. 490, 492-93, 14 N.S.2d 266, 267
(1938).
64 15 Ill. App. 2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205 (1957).
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ponderance of the evidence lies. It thus interprets the "manifest
standard" to require only the slightest amount of evidence in
support of a verdict in order for the appellate court to uphold
the verdict and the trial judge's denial of a motion for a new
65
trial.
Such an interpretation of the "manifest standard" is not
materially different from the "any evidence standard" formerly
applied by the trial judge in ruling on a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. 6 It is submitted that such a strict
interpretation of the standard, deprives the appellate court of
any meaningful discretion to rectify a harsh or relatively arbitrary jury verdict. The facts in Heideman v. Kelsey, 7 are illustrative of such a situation. There, the party clearly entitled to
relief from a harsh jury determination would have been precluded from obtaining it if the strict interpretation of the manifest weight standard were followed. In the Kelsey case, the
decedent, in a will dated January 10, 1950, left the bulk of his
estate to his brothers and sisters. The plaintiff, testator's only
child, challenged the will on the ground that the testator lacked
the necessary testamentary capacity. The trial judge submitted
the case to the jury, which found that the will in question was
not the last will and testament of the decedent. A verdict for
the plaintiff followed and the trial judge denied the defendants'
motion for a new trial. The defendants appealed from this order, alleging-that the verdict was against the "manifest weight
of the evidence."
The reviewing court reconsidered all of the testimony adduced at the trial. The plaintiff's case rested almost entirely on
the testimony of the testator's attending physician, who stated
that, in his opinion, the testator "was simply not competent to
transact ordinary business."6 8 The remaining plaintiff's witnesses testified only as to the physical appearance of the testator
and, when asked, had no opinion as to his mental capacity."'
The defendant's witnesses, on the other hand, twelve in
65 Id.
at 321-22, 146 N.E.2d at 210-11. See also Saikley, The Disciplinary Procedure of the Illinois State Bar Association Under Rule 59 of the
Supreme Court, 52 ILL. B. 3. 912 (1963). In discussing the role of the Board
of Governors in a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, Mr. Saikley

stated:
[Tihe Board of Governors [review the findings of the Hearing Division and in so reviewing] should adhere to the manifest weight of
the evidence doctrine, and modify or reject findings of fact only when
the record contains no evidence whatever to support the findings .
Id. at 916-17.
66 See Stilfield v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 25 Ill. App. 2d 478, 167
N.E.2d 295 (1960) where it was held that if there was any evidence to suport the verdict, a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict must
e denied.
67 414 Ill. 453, 11I N.E.2d 538 (1953).
68 Id. at 456, 111 N.E.2d at 540.
619
Id. at 457-59, 111 N.E.2d at 541.
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number, all agreed that the testator was of sufficient mental
capacity to conduct ordinary business at the time that the will
was executed. 70 In addition, these witnesses were not casual
acquaintances of the decedent, but had known or done business
with him for a considerable length of time. Thus, these witnesses were in an excellent position to know whether the testator
was capable of conducting his business. In further support of
their position, defendants produced two letters written by the
testator, one of which had been written only twelve days prior
to the execution of his will. Considering these letters, the reviewing court stated:
These two exhibits lend much strength to the defense in this case
• . . [and] demonstrate rather conclusively that the testator was
not only capable of thinking clearly but that he was able to express
himself and write with remarkable coherence and conciseness."'
The court concluded by stating:
It is our opinion that the proof in this case demonstrates that
• . . [testator] was a person with adequate testamentary capacity
verdict .. .is against the
on January 10, 1950, and the jury's
72

manifest weight of the evidence.
Because of three subsequent adverse trial court verdicts and
judgments entered thereon, this case was appealed three more
times, on the same facts, for the same reasons, and involving the
same parties.7 3 On the final appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court,
instead of granting a new trial, as the appellate court had previously done, reversed the judgment entered in the trial court on
the verdict.7 4

Significantly, under the strict interpretation of

the "manifest standard" 75 advocated, the supreme court, in Kelsey, would have been required to affirm the denial of the motion
for a new trial because there was a slight amount of evidence
to support the verdict and the jury had reached the same verdict on four occasions.
The second school of thought, explained by the court in the
Bunton case, is more skeptical of the ability of the jury to
correctly determine questions of fact and determine where a
preponderance of the evidence lies. As this school has less faith
in the jury system, it follows that they would require more than
a "slight amount" of evidence in support of a verdict for the
appellate court to uphold the trial judge's denial of a motion for
a new trial. Under the latter's approach, the "manifest standard" has been held to be practically synonymous with the term,
Id. at 460-65, 111 N.E.2d at 542-44.
71 Id. at 465-66, 111 N.E.2d at 544.
70

72 Id. at 466, 111 N.E.2d at 544-45.
7 3 Ill. App. 2d 189, 121 N.E.2d 45 (1954), new trial granted, 7 II. 2d
601, 131 N.E.2d 531 (1956), new trial granted, 19 I1. 2d 258, 166 N.E.2d 596
(1960), rev'd, no remand.
74 19 Ill.2d 258, 166 N.E.2d 596 (1960).
75 See text at notes 65-66 supra.
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"greater weight of the evidence," thus, in effect, allowing the
appellate courts to apply approximately the same standard on
review of the order as applied by the trial courts initially in rul7 6
ing on the motion for a new trial.
It is submitted that this view of the "manifest standard"
is no more equitable than that of the first school of thought."7
This view suffers in that it fails to take cognizance of the fact
that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
and of the additional fact that the trial judge is in a much more
advantageous position to weigh the evidence for the purpose of
ruling on a motion for a new trial.7 8 By disregarding these facts
this school would, in effect, allow the appellate court to substitute
its view of the trial proceedings for that of both the jury and
79
the trial judge.
What a particular appellate court determines to be the appropriate test rule in applying the "manifest standard" to determine the propriety of the trial judge's order denying a new trial
has also been influenced by the type of case, the judges sitting
at the time, and other variable factors which go into making a
decision.8 1 In the interest of developing a more uniform practice with respect to appellate review of motions for a new trial
in order to better approximate equality among litigants, it is
submitted that the courts should choose a single school of thought
to implement the "manifest standard" by "selecting one or the
other, or perhaps striking out upon a third, which will be the
resultant of the two forces in combination, or will represent the
mean between extremes ....81
In summary, the present practice with regard to motions
for a new trial finds the trial court applying the "preponderance
of the evidence standard" to the facts of the case in order to
determine the propriety of a motion for a new trial; and, the
76 Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 15 Ill.
App. 2d 311, 321-22, 146 N.E.2d
205, 209-10 (1957).
77 See text at notes 65-66 supra for a discussion of the alternative school
of thought.
78 Hulke v. International Mfg. Co., 14 Ill. App. 2d 5, 142 N.E.2d 717
(1957).
7 Hilbert v. Dougherty, 34 Ill.
App. 2d 174, 179, 180 N.E.2d 699, 702
(1962). See also text at note 65 supra.
80 Hogan, Some Thoughts on Juries in Civil Cases, 50 A.B.A.J. 752, 753
(1964).

[A judge]

. . .

is presumably learned in the law through education and

experience in dealing with legal problems. He is guided, controlled and
limited by statutes and decisions of higher tribunals. But when confronted with issues of fact in deciding, for example, issues of negligence,
contributory negligence, damages or the veracity of a witness, we judges
must use the same means as jurors - our experience, our native intelligence and our judgment. And, like jurors, we are the products of our
individual environments and experiences. Moreover, each of us carries
within him, unrecognized and unknown to him but perhaps not to others,
certain prejudices and predilections. In a word, we are human beings.
81 B. CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 40 (1948).
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New Trials and the Need for Uniformity in Standards

appellate court applying the "abuse of discretion standard" in
reviewing the trial judge's order granting a new trial, and the
"manifest weight of the evidence standard" in reviewing the
trial judge's order denying a new trial.
SUGGESTED REVISIONS
To promote uniformity and fairness to litigants, it is submitted that the practice with regard to motions for a new trial
should be revised at both the trial and appellate levels.
Revision at the trial level is necessary because of the implicit inequity in the current practice. The propriety of the trial
judge's exercise of discretion is the ultimate factor to be examined by the reviewing court to determine if justice has been
done. The trial judge's determination, through the exercise of
his discretion, of the weight to be accorded to each item of evidence establishes the facts to which he applies the "preponderance of the evidence standard." If the trial judge grants a new
trial based solely on the weight of the evidence, the party against
whom this order is entered finds himself at a distinct disadvantage. That is, he may not appeal from such order as a matter
of right, but must petition for leave to appeal. The reason for
this restricted right of appeal is based primarily on past judicial
practice. Traditionally, an order granting a new trial could not
be appealed because it was not a final order. 82 The basis for
this rule was that the disputed issues might become moot after
the second trial. Further, the appellate courts were apprehensive that they would be overburdened with the review of interlocutory appeals. This restricted right of review not only imposes a hardship on the party who must give up a favorable
verdict, 83 but also indirectly questions the integrity of the jury
by allowing the trial judge so much latitude in granting new
trials.
The procedure involving a motion for a new trial could be
improved by adopting the following alternative at the trial level,
which would further limit the discretion of the trial judge in
ruling on a motion for a new trial and, thus, limit the possibility
of an abuse of his discretion.8 4 This alternative procedure would
continue the use of the "preponderance of the evidence standard"
by the trial judge, but would, in addition, require a written
memorandum by the judge setting forth his reasons for granting
or denying the motion. In other words, this memorandum would
effectively limit any abuse by the trial judge of his discretion by
requiring him to explain why he attributed different weight to
See text at note 43 supra.
83See text at note 45 supra.
4 See text at notes 25-28 supra.
82
8
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the various items of evidence. Such a memorandum would also
be beneficial to the appellate court because it would enable the
court to more objectively and effectively review the trial judge's
order. The appellate courts have, in fact, indicated a desire to
have such a memorandum prepared by the trial judge.8 5
Beneficial revision of the appellate practice involved in reviewing orders either granting or denying motions for a new
trial could be achieved by requiring the appellate court to apply
the "manifest weight of the evidence standard" in its review of
both orders. Such a change would, of course, necessitate the
abandonment of the "abuse of discretion standard" presently
used to review orders granting a new trial.8 6 The appellate court
has, in fact, indicated its dissatisfaction with this standard. 7
The use of a single standard for reviewing both orders should
result in a more uniform practice and, at the same time, put the
parties on a more equal footing.
Ronald L. Hamm

8 E.g., Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill. App. 2d 20, 175 N.E.2d 796 (1961);
Couch v. Southern Ry., 294 Ill. App. 490, 14 N.E.2d 266 (1938).
It is
also significant to note that in 1965 the California General Assembly amended
their Code of Civil Procedure, relating to new trials, to provide the requirement that the trial judge prepare a memorandum setting out his reasons for
granting a new trial.

ANN. CAL. CODES, CODE CIv. PROC. §657 (WEST 1955).

Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill. App. 2d 20, 175 N.E.2d 796 (1961).
See, e.g., Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill. App. 2d 20, 175 N.E.2d 796 (1961)
Coach v. Southern Ry., 294 Ill. App. 490, 14 N.E.2d 266(1938). In each
case, the appellate court intimated that in the absence of a written memorandum prepared by the trial judge setting forth his reasons for granting
a new trial, the court has no adequate means to effectively evaluate the propriety of the trial judge's exercise of discretion under the "abuse of discretion standard."
86
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